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 Voting in National and European  
Parliamentary Elections  
What Determines the Turnout Gap?1 
 
ROXANA NEDELESCU 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Electoral participation and voting decisions play an important role in 
the political process as it directly determines the electoral outcome and 
indirectly, it determines policies. Recent political economy literature focuses on 
individual voter preferences in order to understand turnout patterns.  
A declining2 voter turnout in most advanced industrial countries has 
been observed. Lijphart3 (1997) highlights the decline in turnout and implicit 
drawbacks as low turnout induces in a democracy a “systematically bias against 
less well-to-do citizens”. Furthermore, since governments pursue policies 
according to “objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their 
class defined core political constituencies”, “unequal participation spells 
unequal influence”. He also highlights that “turnout in midterm, regional, local 
and supranational elections ‒ less salient but by no means unimportant elections 
‒ tend to be especially poor”. Therefore, significant variation in voter turnout 
exists both within and across elections4: electoral participation rates differ 
across election type as for example national versus local elections, and tend to 
increase along with the perceived importance of the election as higher 
participation rates are registered for national elections.  
                                                 
1  The author is most grateful for valuable comments to Prof. M. Bordignon, Economics and 
Finance Department, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan.  
2
  Aina Gallego, “Where Else Does Turnout Decline Come From? Education, Age, 
Generation and  Period Effects in Three European Countries”,  Scandinavian Political 
Studies, vol. 32, issue, 1, 2009, pp. 23-44. 
3
  Arend Lijphart, “Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma”, The 
American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 1, 1997, pp. 1-14.  
4
  Andre Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2000. 
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The difference in turnout introduced the concept of “second-order5 
elections”, characterized by a lower turnout and generally viewed as less 
important by parties, voters and the media, referred initially to the first 
European Parliament (EP) elections in 1979 and defined in a later stage as “All 
elections (except the one that fills the most important political office of the 
entire system and therefore is the first-order election), irrespective of whether 
they take place in the entire, or only in a part of the country”6. Furthermore, in 
“second-order” elections, it was observed that governing parties loose votes in 
favor of opposition as a form of voter’s protest against scarce performance, 
while small parties gain votes. 
In this paper we consider these issues and investigate patterns in voter 
turnout both at European and National elections. We insist on the former 
election type as the European Parliament is the only EU institution directly 
elected by the EU citizenry and despite the fact that its powers increasingly 
grew in importance over time, the opposite happened with voter turnout: in 
2014, it was registered the lowest turnout for the EP Elections, of only 42.6% 
(EP), while in 2009, 43% (TNS opinion & EP). Therefore, low turnout is a 
concern for policy makers since low levels of electoral participation in the 
European Parliament elections may accentuate the legitimacy and democracy 
problems at the European Union level. As such, it is important to understand 
why electoral participation at the European level is low and how it can be 
increased, given that increasing electoral participation may be a way of 
increasing EU’s legitimacy, driven by public support. 
This research work aims at investigating voting turnout and behavior 
from two perspectives: individual and aggregate. We address several research 
questions and test the “second-order” theory: does lower turnout induce 
inequality in electoral participation and if that is the case, how is it mirrored by 
parties vote shares; what determines turnout and how can the electoral gap be 
explained and reduced: does politicians’ quality, electoral systems, party 
performance matter?  
Empirical evidence highlights the difference in voters behavior across 
National and European elections as well as a steep gap between turnout. The 
European Parliament elections remain of a “second-order” nature. We also find 
that socioeconomic status has a significant role in explaining the EP electoral 
participation and that there exist a representation bias for the higher 
socioeconomic categories. When deciding to participate to the European 
elections, individuals asses the candidates' personality, notoriety, experience 
                                                 
5
  Karlheinz Reif, Hermann Schimtt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual 
Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results”, European Journal of 
Political Research, no. 8, 1980, pp. 3-44. 
6
  Karlheinz Reif, “European Elections as Member State Second-Order Elections Revisited”, 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. XXXI, no. 1, 1997, pp. 115-124. 
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and position in both National and European political scene, as well as the 
candidate and party position on EU politics. For the National elections, interest 
in politics increases significantly the probability of participating to National 
Elections.  
Changing perspective from individual to aggregate level, we find that 
politicians voting across national lines instead of European party ideology 
decreases party vote share. Large parties, parties in net payer and euro zone 
countries lose votes across elections. Evidence does not show that the European 
elections are used strategically to punish governing parties. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics, while Section 3 presents the estimation strategy. Empirical 
results are given in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. Full estimations results 
are given in the Appendix. 
 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Political participation is a basic democratic principle because trough 
elections citizens choose and recognize the authority of decision-makers that 
legitimate them to govern. The role of political institutions, economic policies 
and their effects on the economy has been the focus of Political Economy 
studies from a macroeconomic perspective. Government's actions are analyzed 
depending on the political forces which enable them to be in power. From a 
microeconomic perspective, previous Political Economy studies focus on voters 
and their preferences. Since political parties, governments and policies are the 
equilibrium outcome of voters' decision-making7, two main questions are 
addressed: why, and how, voters vote.   
In this paper, we will focus on the later question. However, “why” and 
“how” citizens vote are interconnected questions, as a person will vote 
strategically in order to incline the voting outcome in their favor. When 
comparing8 strategic with sincere non-voting, and distinguishing between little 
support for the EU (“I don’t like Europe”) and little policy appeal of political 
parties (“I do not have a reasonable choice”), as well as controlling for little 
support for national politics, little appeal for general parties (“There is no party I 
could support”), involvement (“I don't care”) and lack of efficacy (“My vote 
does not matter”) empirical evidence does not support the strategic or sincere 
                                                 
7 
 David Austen-Smith, Jeffrey Banks, Positive Political Theory I Collective Preference, 
University of Michigan Press, 1999; Idem, Positive Political Theory II Strategy and 
Structure, University of Michigan Press, 2005. 
8  Hermann Schmitt, Cees van der Eijk, “Strategic Non-Voting in European Parliament 
Elections”, Prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association in San Francisco, August 30 to September 2, 2001. 
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non-voting theory. Evidence is found for social characteristics, which seems to 
be a better predictor. In fact, Lijphart (1997) argues that poorer and less 
educated individuals are less likely to vote. Therefore, low voter turnout may 
induce unequal representation and may be in fact an important democratic 
problem which depends mainly on institutional mechanisms.  
Using regional inequality and poverty indexes Jesuit9 (2002), estimate 
individual political participation in national elections as well as in the European 
elections. The analysis has at its basis the “regionalization” process within 
Europe, tracing its roots to the founding of the Community to present, having 
the Structural Funds as main policy instrument targeting regional disparities 
reduction. No negative effects of contextual poverty is found. However, among 
most important findings, individuals living in economically disadvantaged 
regions are more likely to vote in elections for the European Parliament. Also, 
low income and less educated persons are less likely to vote in either National 
or European Parliament election. Furthermore, the author analyzes the pros and 
cons of different voting systems such as proportional and compulsory voting: 
while the former stimulate voter participation through the richness of choice, the 
latter is definitively the most efficient and cost reducing, but has the 
disadvantage of forcing to vote individuals with little political interest which is 
even riskier.  
However, structural factors10 have not influenced the decrease in 
European elections turnout. The countries joining the EU were different in 
terms of electoral systems. Correcting for turnout differences had the proportion 
of countries with compulsory voting been constant over time, little evidence is 
found in supporting the fact that compulsory-voting alone was driving high 
level of turnout in European elections.  
Furthermore, there is a boost in electoral participation for the European 
Parliament for the newcomer States, which is lost in the following elections. An 
important factor is instead national elections proximity to the European 
elections that tend to induce a boost in the latter participation level. Therefore, 
EP elections may be solely a reflection of the national elections perceived 
importance, the low turnout suggesting that are not viewed as very important.  
This is the one of components of the second-order election theory, 
founded by Reif and Schmitt (1980) and confirmed for all EP elections: 
European elections are influenced by the national election scene and are not as 
important. Voters use European elections as a protest against governing parties, 
while large parties loose votes across the two elections. In the literature, 
empirical evidence was found for the second-order theory, individuals switch-
                                                 
9
  David Jesuit, Regional Economic Distress and Political Participation in National and 
European Parliamentary Elections in Western Europe, Working Paper No. 281, 2002. 
10
  Mark Franklin, “How Structural Factors Cause Turnout Variations at European 
Parliament Elections”,  European Union Politics, vol. 2, no. 3, 2001, pp. 309-323. 
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voting11 across parties and elections. But voters also give importance to policy 
outcome. Second-order theory states that the EP elections are used to protest 
against governments in power12. Using multivariate analysis, empirical evidence 
shows however that in the new Member States, citizens use EP elections to vote 
sincerely supporting their most preferred party, and not to protest against 
incumbent governments.  
This result is strengthened by Weber (2007)13. He uses survey data for 
1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections, insisting on party campaign 
mobilization. EP elections are found to be of second-order nature, but are not 
used for protesting against governing parties. Low turnout is due to the low 
party campaign mobilization. Compulsory voting, weekend voting and elections 
held simultaneously with EP elections increase turnout. EU-supportive 
countries as well as countries benefiting from the European integration process 
have a higher turnout14.  
In order to obtain a complete picture of the factors influencing EP turnout 
and to disentangle among different motivations15 of EU support/aversion, several 
theories have been tested using 2009 survey data: performance, utilitarianism, 
negative affection, strengthening and identity. The main findings support the 
facts that low utility from European Union participation, negative affection 
towards the EU, opposing integration and absence of European Union identity 
decrease turnout at European level.  
Furthermore, mass-media and elections visibility have an important role 
in explaining turnout differences across European and National elections. 
Empirical analysis based on the Eurobarometer Flash Survey referring to the 
2004 EP elections, show that low voters mobilization16 is significant in 
explaining voters' turnout. Low-turnout in the European elections is due to the 
lack of party mobilization and avoidance of clear political position on policy-
making at EU level (Weber, 2007). Therefore more involvement from parties 
                                                 
11 
 Cliff Carrubba, Richard Timpone,  “Explaining Vote Switching Across First- and Second-
Order Elections Evidence From Europe”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 38, no. 3, 
2005, pp. 260-281.  
12
  Jason Koepke, Nils Ringe, “The Second-order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe”, 
European Union Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 2006, pp. 321-346. 
13 
 Till Weber, “Campaign Effects and Second-Order Cycles: A Top-Down Approach to 
European Parliament Elections”, European Union Politics, vol. 8, no. 4, 2007, pp. 509-553. 
14
  Daniel Stockemer, “Citizens’ Support for the European Union and Participation in the 
European Parliament Elections”,  European Union Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, 2011, pp. 26-46; 
Mikko Mattila, “Why Bother? Determinants of Turnout in the European Elections”, 
Electoral Studies, 22, 2003, pp. 449-468. 
15
  Joost van Spanje, Claes de Vreese, “So What's Wrong with the EU? Motivations 
Underlying the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2009 European Elections”, European Union 
Politics, vol. 12, no. 3, 2011, pp. 405-429. 
16 
 Susan Banducci, “Turnout in the 2004 European Parliamentary Elections: Campaigns and 
the Mobilization of Eurosceptic Voters”. Paper prepared for presentation at the Institute for 
Governance Conference, Workshop Innovation of Governance, June 16-17, 2005, Universiteit 
Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands. 
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and more media coverage on the European elections might increase the number 
of voters as more informed voters are more likely to vote (Bilska, 2011). These 
results indicate that lack of information, either due to lack of interest or lack of 
knowledge, decrease EP elections turnout.  
Accounting for previous studies and factors discussed in this section, 
the paper builds on the works of Reif and Schmitt (1980) concerning the 
“second-order” theory, and of Lijphart (1997) concerning political 
representation. We investigate turnout determinants at National and European 
elections and test the “second-order” theory. We start by analyzing individual 
voting behavior across “first-order” National elections and “second-order” 
European elections. Given that for the European Parliament elections turnout 
has always been lower with respect to National Parliament elections, our 
hypothesis is that it is more likely that voters' skewed participation exists only at 
European level. The aim is to test if Lijphart's hypothesis regarding unequal 
participation when turnout is low, holds.  
Since European integration has provided “elites”17 with new 
opportunities to exploit their human capital, to live and work wherever they 
choose within the European Union and allowed them to have more flexibility to 
travel at lower costs, these categories may be more likely to go to vote in the 
European elections. If this is the case, we hypothesize that if people vote 
according to their socioeconomic category, political representation is skewed 
towards the category that votes more. Since politicians target policies to their 
public, this trend could further induce a political representation gap that would 
accentuate socio-economic inequalities in EU, creating socio-political instability18. 
To this purpose, we estimate the probability of voting in the European 
and National elections using data from the 4th wave of the European Social 
Survey (ESS, 2008) for National parliamentary elections, and from the Standard 
Eurobarometer Survey (EB 71.1, 2009) for European parliamentary elections, 
respectively. We restrict the samples to common individual-level data, in order 
to compare the effect of socioeconomic categories on turnout rate across 
elections. Electoral participation estimation is further performed re-specifying 
the models and using the enhanced data sets. The individual-level estimations 
are complemented by testing the “second-order” theory at aggregate level, 
looking at how governing parties do across elections in terms of vote share 
differential. We test19 whether or not inequality in electoral participation 
                                                 
17
  Simon Hix, What's Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, England, 2008. 
18
  Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and 
Investment”, European Economic Review, vol. 40, issue 6, 1996, pp. 1203-1228. 
19
  To this purpose an original data set is built concerning the parties vote shares obtained in 
European and National elections. We investigate the difference across the two, accounting 
for party characteristics, politicians and country characteristics as well as macroeconomic 
conditions. 
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induces inequality in political representation as well and investigate what 
determines turnout gap in vote shares obtained by parties across elections.  
Concerning the enhanced estimations, national electoral participation is 
estimated as a function of individual characteristics (e.g. age, gender, 
occupation, education, nationality), government satisfaction and trust in national 
Parliament. European electoral participation is estimated as a function of 
individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, 
occupation, education, nationality, political orientation), MEPs vote criteria 
(e.g. notoriety, national and European experience, etc.) and political information 
(e.g. knowledge about the EP, MEPs, political discussions on EU).  
However, political information may be an endogenous explanatory 
covariate when explaining turnout20 since unobservable variables may 
determine both support for the European Union and the desire to acquire 
political knowledge21. Different approaches are used in order to identify the 
causal effect of political knowledge on policy allocation level. In the literature, 
exogenous information sources citizens are exposed to, as well as politicians 
reputation are used as instruments in order to isolate the causal effect of 
information on participation. Following these studies, by introducing a variable 
in our model that catch EU support (i.e. EU has a positive image, attachment 
and trust towards EU) should reduce the bias. 
Trough elections, citizens could hold politicians and governments in 
fact, accountable. At the EP level, it would imply to actually promote or punish 
the MEPs, by re-electing them in office or not based on their activity and 
policies promoted, and so making the EP accountable22 to its electorate. 
Therefore, it is important to examine MEPs characteristics in the context of 
European elections23. As such, we account for politicians' personal24 
characteristics such as honesty, integrity and competence, particularly when 
sanctions are limited. Empirical findings suggest that European elections may 
indeed represent a selection process, voters rewarding25 good party politicians at 
EU level.  
                                                 
20 
 Valentino Larcinese, “Does Political Knowledge Increase Turnout? Evidence from the 
1997 British General Election”, Public Choice, vol. 131, no. 3/4, 2007, pp. 387-411. 
21
  Floriana Cerniglia, Laura Pagani, “Does Political Knowledge Increase Support for 
Europe? A Cross Country Investigation of the Attitudes of European Citizens”, Cesifo 
Working Paper No. 3369, 2011. 
22
  Andreas Follesdal, Simon Hix, “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A 
Response to Majone and Moravcsik”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, no. 3, 
2006, pp. 533-562. 
23
  Pippa Norris, Mark Franklin, “Social Representation”, European Journal of Political 
Research no. 35, 1997, pp.185-210.  
24
  Timothy Besley, Rohini Pande, Vijayendra Rao, “Selection and the Quality of 
Government: Evidence from South India”, Yale University, Economic Growth Centre 
Discussion Paper 21, 2005. 
25
  Sara Hobolt, Bjorn Hoyland, “Political Selection and Electoral Competition in Second 
Order Elections”, 2008, earlier version presented at the EUSA conference in May 2007.  
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The EP elections can be also modeled as a Principal (i.e. voters) ‒ 
Agent (i.e. MEPs) and when information on agent's actions cannot be perceived, 
politicians experience might be an important determinant26 in the selection 
process. Empirical evidence suggests that politicians experience is important in 
the European elections in terms of party vote share, as voters reward parties 
whom present experienced candidates to run for political office. Therefore, 
elections represent the selection mechanisms of naming politicians in office.  
It is important to mention in this context that European electoral system 
is quite peculiar since it is based on national parties, but its outcome is not the 
formation of a government, while the electoral systems differ across Member 
States. As such, the performance of European politicians is less visible to the 
electorate and more difficult to be assessed and be held accountable. Since 
electoral rules are important, directly electing the MEPs, rather than choosing 
from a party ranked list, might increase legitimacy of the European Parliament 
and might incentivize the EU citizenry to participate to the European elections. 
Changing27 the electoral rules might bring the EU and therefore the EP closer to 
its citizens, making the process more democratic.  
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
  The data used in this paper refers to the Eurobarometer Survey (EB 71.1) 
concerning the 2009 European Elections and the European Social Survey (ESS, 
4th wave) concerning last National elections, conducted on behalf of the 
European Commission. In addition, an unique data set concerning party vote 
shares obtained across elections is used28.  
 The Eurobarometer Survey encloses data29 that capture the electoral 
behavior in of EU 27 Member States30 citizenry in the 2009 European 
                                                 
26 
 Timothy Besley, “Political Selection”, Journal of Economic Perspectives in Politics, vol. 3, 
no. 19, 2005, pp. 43-60. 
27
  Simon Hix, Sara Hagemann, “Could Changing the Electoral Rules Fix European 
Parliament Elections?”, Politique européenne vol. 2,  no. 28, 2009, pp. 37-52. 
28
  It refers to the 2004, 2009 EP elections and previous national parliament elections. 
29  The sample size is usually of 1000 respondents per country (face-to-face interviews), with 
some exceptions (e.g. Luxembourg-300; Malta-500; Cyprus-500; Iceland-600; Germany-
2000, 150; United Kingdom-1300). Given the heterogeneity of nations in terms of 
population size, weighting is used in order to adjust the sample size to each nation 
universe. 
30  In the Eurobarometer 71.1 there were interviewed 30.232 citizens in the 27 countries of 
the European Union after the 2004/2007 enlargement (i.e. including the Accession 
Countries Romania and Bulgaria), in the remaining Candidate Countries (CC) Croatia and 
Turkey, as well as among the Turkish Cypriote Community (TCC) and in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). All respondents were residents in the 
respective country, nationals and non-nationals but EU-citizens, and aged 15 and over.  
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Parliament elections. More specifically, the survey contains a wide range of 
information concerning individual characteristics such as age, gender, 
education, civil status and labor market status. The data captures subjective 
knowledge about the EP elections (e.g. knowledge about the European 
Parliament, knowledge on MEP election procedure), political attitudes and 
electoral intentions. The main question of interest is:  
 
 “Can you tell me on a scale of 1 to 10 how likely it is that you would vote in the 
next European elections in June 2009? Please place yourself at a point on this scale where 
‘1’ indicates that you would ‘definitely not vote’, ‘10’ indicates that you would ‘definitely 
vote’ and the remaining numbers indicates something in between these two positions?”. 
 
 We consider as dependent variable individuals placing themselves strictly 
above 5 on the scale indicating the likelihood of voting31. Given that the survey 
was conducted before actual elections took place, we must rely on the reported 
vote probability32.  
 The European Social Survey encloses data concerning national elections 
for 17 EU Member States as well as non-EU countries; we restrict the ESS 
sample33 only to the EU members in which the survey was conducted. Besides 
data on demographics, ESS encloses interesting data concerning national 
democracy and government satisfaction. The main question of interest is: “Did 
you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]? Yes/No/Not 
eligible”. As dependent34 variable, we consider individuals answering yes. 
 The last data35 set used, is an unbalanced panel data enclosing 238 
observations for 24 Member States36 and originates mainly from The Parliament 
and Government Composition Database (European University Institute, 2010) 
and IDEA (International Insitute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) 
                                                 
31
  In the Eurobarometer Survey, vote probability over/under-reporting might emerge due to 
the fact that the survey was conducted before the actual election took place. In order to 
check robustness, an alternative threshold (individuals placing themselves strictly above 7 
on the vote likelihood scale) has been used, that held similar results, not reported here. 
Furthermore, ordered regressions have been used, reported in the empirical results section.  
32
  Voting intentions and real turnout are positively correlated. 
33  EU Member States not included in the European Social Survey are: Austria, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Republic of  Cyprus, Malta, and Slovakia. 
For these countries empirical analysis is not conducted at National elections level, but 
only at European elections when we re-specify the models. 
34
  In the European Social Survey, vote probability over-reporting might emerge since 
citizens that voted might tend to participate more in surveys, they may also say they voted 
even if they didn’t. 
35  In the following Section 3.4, the Estimation Strategy is given, explaining these variables 
role. 
36 
 EU Member States not included in the sample are Luxembourg, Malta and Republic of 
Cyprus. Furthermore, given limited observation number, data is not further restricted to 
17 Members common to all surveys.  
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concerning party vote shares in the European Parliament elections (i.e. 2004, 
2009) as well as party vote shares in previous national elections and turnout. 
Our dependent variable is given by the vote share differential across elections.  
 The data set includes party characteristics as well (i.e. country, left to 
right political ideology, number of seats obtained-party size, election date). 
Party political ideology is an indicator ranging from 1-left to 10-right. In the 
empirical analysis dummy variables have been used in order to group political 
ideology from extreme left to extreme right. In addition, we account for each 
party’s left-right position distance with respect to the center of the scale as a 
measure of political extremism. We complement these data by adding European 
Parliament Members (MEP) characteristics (e.g. attendance rate, loyalty to 
political group, loyalty to country majority) which have been extracted from 
Vote Watch37. Party politicians characteristics are continuous variables and 
refer to plenary sessions attendance (registered or voted), how often an MEP 
voted along the majority line as MEPs from the same political group (loyalty to 
political group) and how often an MEP voted along the lines of the same 
country MEPs majority (e.g. loyalty to country majority). We include these 
variables in order to determine the role MEPs quality play in the vote shares a 
party gets, having in mind that a high-quality MEP would bring more votes in 
the EP elections. 
 Macroeconomic indicators are also accounted for. GDP per capita 
(Eurostat) accounts for country’s economic activity and approximates living 
standards, in understand the electoral gap. We add country characteristics such 
as net payer/receiver to the EU budget which have been extracted from the 
European Commission Financial Report (2009). Net payer/receiver38 is an 
indicator that shows a country financial loss or gain from being an EU member, 
for the period under analysis. Being a net payer actually means more losses 
from contributing than receiving from the EU budget and could be a possible 
explanation of low electoral participation in the EP elections. However, net 
payer/receiver refers strictly to accounting and does not cover any other benefit 
from EU membership in terms of policies.  
 European Monetary Union (EMU) membership is taken into 
consideration as well since it involves stricter economic conditions to be met, 
differentiating across countries. EMU variable indicates if an EU Member State 
                                                 
37
  Vote Watch is a non-profit organization which aims at increasing EU transparency, by 
providing information on the European Parliament and Council of Ministers decision-
making procedures. 
38
  Based on European Commission 2009 Financial Report- “Operating budgetary balances’ 
are calculated, for a given Member State, as the difference between allocated operating 
expenditure (i.e. excluding administration) and own resources payments (excluding 
traditional own resources)”. A positive operating budgetary balance indicates a net 
receiver while a negative operating budgetary budget indicates a net contributor Member 
State. 
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is part of the euro zone, or not. In fact, EMU countries may blame the EU for 
the worsening of living standards, which could translate into an increased gap 
across elections.  
 Government variable, refers to whether or not a given party was forming 
the government at the time of the European Parliament elections. By controlling 
for this, we actually want to see if the European elections are used as a protest 
against the current government or not. If government parties lose votes in the 
European Parliament elections, which timing does not generally coincide with 
national elections, this would mean that the former elections are used to trigger 
an alarm signal against the governing parties.  
 Electoral system difference is a dummy variable indicating whether or not 
the electoral rules differ across national and European elections. We account for 
electoral systems differences in terms of electoral formula and ballot structure 
in order to understand if voters might be confused concerning electoral 
procedures across elections which would induce a decreased electoral 
participation.  
 To have a better understanding of the electoral system across election 
types, Table 139 presents the types of electoral systems40 in place for each 
election type and European Union Member State. For the EP elections, in 
practice 25 Member States use the List - PR system, while Malta and the 
Republic of Ireland use the Single Transferable Vote.  
 In nine Member States the voters cannot alter the order in which 
candidates appear on a list (closed list). In fourteen Members, casting 
preferential votes may change the order of names on the list (semi-open list). In 
Ireland Malta and Northern Ireland the lists are open; the electors vote for 
individual candidates, every voter listing the candidates in order of preference 
(single transferable vote). In Luxembourg voters may cross-vote, meaning they 
vote for candidates from different lists and have as many votes as there are 
mandates to allocate. In Sweden voters may also add or delete names from the 
list. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
  The electoral system comparison is given for all EU Member States for completeness 
reasons. However, Luxembourg, Malta and  Republic of Cyprus are not included in the 
dataset enclosing electoral system differences. 
40  A more detailed description of the electoral systems can be found in Electoral Systems in 
Europe: An Overview, ‒ An ECPRD publication on topical parliamentary affairs, 2000. 
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Table 1 
Electoral Systems 
Country European Parliament  National Parliament 
 
Austria PR with preferential vote 4 % threshold PR with preferential vote 4 % 
threshold 
Belgium PR with preferential vote PR with preferential vote 
Bulgaria PR PR with preferential vote 4 % 
threshold 
Cyprus PR with preferential vote 1,8 % 
threshold 
PR with preferential vote 
Czech Republic PR with preferential vote 5 % threshold PR with preferential vote 
Denmark PR with preferential vote PR with preferential vote 
Estonia PR with closed lists PR 
Finland PR with preferential vote PR with preferential vote 
France PR with closed lists 5 % threshold Second Ballot Majority Runoff 
Germany PR with closed lists 5 % threshold Mixed Proportional system 
Greece PR with closed lists 3 % threshold PR with preferential vote 
Hungary PR with closed lists 5% threshold Mixed Member Proportional 
system 
Ireland PR with STV STV 
Italy PR with preferential vote 4 % threshold Additional member system 
Latvia PR with preferential vote 5% threshold PR with preferential vote 
Lithuania PR with preferential vote 5% threshold Additional Member system 
Luxembourg PR with preferential vote PR with vote-splitting 
Malta PR with STV STV 
Netherlands PR with preferential vote PR with closed lists 
Poland PR with closed lists 5% threshold PR with closed lists 5-8% 
threshold 
Portugal PR with closed lists PR with closed lists 
Romania PR with preferential vote 5% threshold PR with closed lists 3% threshold 
Slovakia PR with preferential vote 5% threshold PR with closed lists 
Slovenia PR with preferential vote 4 % threshold PR with Preferential vote 
Spain PR with closed lists Additional Member system 
Sweden PR with preferential vote 4% threshold PR with closed lists 
United 
Kingdom 
PR with closed lists  
(Northern Ireland PR with STV) 
Simple Majority Vote 
PR - Proportional representation; STV - Single Transferable Vote 
  
To start with, empirical analysis will be conducted restricting the 
sample to common EU Members initially. In order to exploit the EB survey, 
estimations will be conducted using enhanced data in a later stage. Figure 1 
presents a clear view on individuals' probability41 of voting, comparing the 
probability of voting for (2009) European and previous National elections.  
                                                 
41
  Citizens of Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Republic of 
Cyprus, Malta, and Slovakia have not be interviewed in the European Social Survey. 
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We observe that both using individual-level data and real turnout, the 
gap in participation exists still across elections. Differences in self-declared 
intention/reported vote exists due to the fact that individuals tend to over-report 
voting, and individuals declaring that they intend to vote/voted tend to take part 
more in surveys with respect to others as well as by the fact that self-reported votes 
are not always valid. The electoral register, where applicable as the basis for 
computing turnout, may not be completely accurate since may be compiled in advance 
of the elections day and not all individuals that subscribed actually participate. 
Figure 1 
National and European Elections Participation Rate,  
Gap (%), by Country 
                                                                                                                       
Weighted statistics in order to account for the sample size in report to country universe, 
are given for individuals whom vote in both the National and European elections. Real 
turnout is given in Appendix, Figure 1.1. 
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To start with, the participation rate is always higher in national elections 
with respect to the European ones. The country with the higher electoral 
participation rate is Belgium, while the lowest national rates are registered in 
Czech Republic for national election rates and in Poland for the EP election rates. 
In terms of occupation, the electoral participation rate is given in Figure 
2. Once again we observe that national participation rates overcomes the 
European ones, for each occupational category. It can be noticed that at 
European level, there exists a discrepancy across voting probability as top-down 
(e.g. Professional, Manager, High-skilled White Collar, etc.) are more likely to 
vote with respect to bottom-up occupational categories  (e.g. Low-skilled White 
Collars, Farmers and Fishermen, Blue Collars).  The highest gap between 
National/European electoral participation rates is at the bottom of the 
occupational categories: Blue Collars, Farmers and Fishermen. It is here where 
more voting incentives should be placed.   
 
Figure 2 
National and European Elections Participation Rate 
Gap (%), by Occupation  
 
 
An enhanced attention will be given to the European Elections voting 
criteria. Table 2 offers some preliminary suggestions on  how do people decide 
whom to vote for by showing the joint probability of voting (i.e. yes/no) and 
voting criteria.  
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Table 2 
Vote Probability Distribution over Vote Criteria (EU 27), EP Elections 
Vote Criteria 
Vote Probability (%) 
 
No Yes Total 
European Elections vote: Candidate Personality 31.31 68.69 100 
European Elections vote: Candidate National Politics Position 33.12 66.88 100 
European Elections vote: Candidate European Politics Position 25.70 74.30 100 
European Elections vote: Candidate Party EU Politics Position 22.97 77.03 100 
European Elections vote: Candidate Notoriety 39.70 60.30 100 
European Elections vote: Candidate Experience in EU Politics  29.58 70.42 100 
European Elections vote: Candidate Experience in National Politics  33.06 66.94 100 
European Elections vote: None 85.80 14.20 100 
European Elections vote: Other Motivation 28.27 71.73 100 
European Elections vote: Do not Know Motivation 66.53 33.47 100 
Total 36.92 63.08 100 
 
 Choosing only one possible vote criteria, for 77% of individuals that 
would go to vote, the main element in their decision would be the position on 
European politics of candidate’s party. Also an important criterion is the 
position of the MEP on European Politics since 74% of individuals going to 
vote, would consider this as main element when casting their vote.  
 Candidate's experience in national politics matter, as 70% of citizens that vote 
considers this as main vote criteria, as well as his/ hers experience and position on the 
national political scene (main voting criteria for 66% of individuals that would 
vote). Subjective aspects are also important, such as candidate's personality 
which is the main voting criteria for 68% of individuals that would vote and 
notoriety which is the main voting criteria for 60% of individuals that would 
vote. For 71% of individuals that expressed their intention to vote, there are 
however other possible motivations to consider. Furthermore, 68% of survey 
respondents that intend to go to vote believe that MEPs sit in the European 
Parliament according to party political affinities, highlighted in Table 342.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 
 Appendix, Table 3. Vote probability distribution over MEP characteristics (EU 27), EP 
Elections. 
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Table 3 
Vote Probability Distribution over MEP Characteristics (EU 27) 
EP Elections 
European  Parliament  Members Affiliation Vote Probability (%) 
No Yes Total 
Nationality 34.58 65.42 100 
Political affinities 31.03 68.97 100 
Do not know 48.75 51.25 100 
Total 36.92 63.08 100 
     
 In the ESS sample, the majority of respondents went to vote in the 
national elections (92.15%). In the sample there are more men than women and 
most of respondents have a center political ideology, upper secondary level of 
education and are quite interested in politics. 57% of respondents are fairly 
satisfied with their life as a whole, 48% are rather satisfied with how democracy 
works in their country, but a majority of 41% or respondents are rather 
unsatisfied with their national government performance. In the National elections, the 
more satisfied citizens are with national democracy and national government, the 
higher the probability of voting. This information is given in Table 443. 
 
Table 4 
Vote Probability, over Satisfaction with Democracy and Government (EU17) 
National Elections 
 
How satisfied with the  way  
democracy  works in the   
country? 
Vote probability  
(%) 
How satisfied with 
the national 
government? 
 
Vote probability 
(%) 
 
 
Scale No  Yes  Scale No  Yes  Total 
Not Very Satisfied 11.96 88.04 Not Very Satisfied 10.79 89.21 100 
Rather Satisfied 9.78 90.22 Rather Satisfied 8.16 91.84 100 
Rather Satisfied 5.90 94.10 Rather Satisfied 5.11 94.89 100 
Very Satisfied 4.51 95.49 Very Satisfied 8.24 91.76 100 
Total 7.61 92.39 Total 7.61 92.39 100 
  
 Figures 3-5 provide more insights concerning the aggregate level data. 
Figure 3 provides information that relates vote share gap by party political 
                                                 
43 
 Appendix, Table 4. Vote probability over satisfaction with democracy and government 
(EU17), National Elections. 
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orientation. Center parties have the least gap in turnout across elections. 
Moving, from the center towards the extremes, the gap increases.  
 
Figure 3 
Parties Vote Share Gap by Political Orientation 
 
 
Figure 4 
Parties Vote Share at European and National Level, by EMU 
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 Figure 4, above, presents the bivariate relation between national and 
European turnout in terms of party vote share, across EMU countries. 
Comparing slopes of different groups, we observe a higher vote share gap 
across elections for EMU countries. 
 Figure 5, below, provides information on vote share gap, differentiating 
by being a net-contributor/net-receiver at the EU budget. We observe a positive 
relationship between the variables as they both have upward slopes. Parties 
within net-receivers countries have a smaller gap across elections with respect 
to net-payer countries, but the gap increases as national vote shares increases. 
 
Figure 5 
Parties Vote Share at European and National Level, by EU Budget 
Contribution 
 
  
 
ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
The probability of voting in the European and National elections, 
restricting44 the samples to common individual-level data is estimated as a 
function of demographic and socio-economic variables (i.e. age, dummies for 
                                                 
44
  Exact survey questions for European elections are available at, http://zacat.gesis. 
org/webview/, respectively at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/round-
index.html for national elections. 
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gender, education, occupation, civic status), political orientation (i.e. dummies 
for extreme left-extreme right political views) and country effects (dummies for 
nationality). For the European elections, 2009 electoral participation is 
measured by vote intention (anticipated) while for the National elections, 
previous electoral participation is measured by reported turnout (retroactive). 
The time span between elections is minimum45.  
In order to allow comparison between European and National elections 
vote probability, we shape both dependent variables as dichotomous: taking 
value 1 if voted and 0 if not. To start with, we confront voting behavior across 
elections and restrict the data to common set of controls. The main question we 
address is: do socioeconomic characteristics induce unequal electoral 
participation? We apply Logit model to estimate the effect of occupational 
categories on voting probability. The formal estimated regression is given by:                                       
Vix=D’ixα+P’ixβ+O’ixγ+C’ixλ+ε ix, where 
  (1) 
The probability of voting for citizen i in election x, Vix is given by: 
          Vix=1 if participates to vote                                     
          Vix=0 if does not participates to vote 
               xϵ {e, n}, where: 
e-European elections, n-National elections. D’ix represents a vector of 
demographic characteristics such as age and dummy variables regarding, 
gender, civil status and education (i.e. age when finished education); P’ix 
represents a vector of political orientation (i.e. dummies for extreme left to 
extreme right), O’ix represent a vector of occupational categories (i.e. dummies 
for being a Professional, Manager, High/Low Skilled White Collar, Blue Collar, 
Farmer and Fishermen), its coefficient γ being our main variable of interest; C’ix 
represents a vector of country dummies (17 EU members); εix is the error term 
which is assumed to have a standard logistic distribution.  
After confronting voting behavior using the same variables for 
European and National elections, estimations are further performed using the 
enhanced data sets, accounting for supplementary information. For the 2009 EP 
elections, when estimating turnout, additional covariates that can be used refer 
to MEPs vote criteria (e.g. notoriety, national and European experience, etc.) 
and citizens information concerning the elections and the European Parliament, 
to start with. The formal estimated regression46 is given by:                                       
                                                 
45
  The survey question refers to last national election and the date of survey is 2008. 
Previous  national elections range between 2004-2008 depending on the country, not 
mentioned in the ESS questionnaire.  
46  Equation (2) is estimated firstly by using Logit. Taking advantage of the dependent 
variable ordered structure as well as to account for the differences between voting 
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 European Elections:               
     Vie=D’ieα+P’ieβ+O’ieγ+B’ieδ +I’ieη+C’ieλ+ε ie, 
where           (2) 
The probability of vote of citizen i in Eurpean Parliament elections47, Vie: 
          Vie=1 if  participates to vote                               
          Vie=0 if  does not participates to vote, where: 
P’ie is a vector which encloses now dummy variables regarding political 
orientation (i.e. extreme left-extreme right) and political debates frequency. 
Additional controls are denoted by B’ie which is a vector of vote criteria 
(benchmark for voting i.e. dummies for candidate personality, experience, 
notoriety) and I’ie  which is a vector referring to information variables (i.e. 
dummies for knowledge about the European Parliament, MEP election, mass-
media information sources). εie is the error term, which is assumed to have a 
standard logistic distribution.  
 Political information however, given that refers to knowledge about the 
European Parliament, its members and political discussion on European topics, 
may be endogenous as being in favor of the European Union and its institutions 
may induce citizens to gather more information, debate and to participate to 
European elections. But if support for the European Union itself drives citizens 
to get more information on the EU institutions, and to participate more in the 
elections, we need to capture the “Europeanism” degree48 and to account for 
EU-support effects in the empirical analysis since it may influence both the 
willingness to acquire information and to participate in the European Parliament 
Elections. As such, we include in the regression a covariate that refers to trust in 
the European Parliament. Since trust49 is a key element for building a common 
political identity, and support for the European Union, this variable should 
control for unobservable EU support, likely to simultaneously determine turnout 
and information acquisition.  
 Citizens ideological left-right political ideology self-placement enclosed 
in the model should capture as well some of the unobserved heterogeneity that 
drives both turnout and political knowledge. Mass-media information sources is 
enclosed among covariates in order to capture the impact of mass media on 
turnout, together with covariates related to EMU membership and occupational 
categories interaction terms with EMU membership in order to better capture 
                                                                                                                       
probability and real turnout, we apply ordered models as well. Findings support initial 
findings; not reported. 
47
  EU 27. 
48  Floriana Cerniglia, Laura Pagani, “Does Political Knowledge Increase Support for 
Europe? A Cross Country Investigation of the Attitudes of European Citizens”, Cesifo 
Working Paper No. 3369, 2011. 
49  Claus Offe, “How Can we Trust our Fellow Citizens?”, in Mark E. Warren (ed.), 
Democracy and Trust, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 42-87. 
Voting in National and European Parliamentary Elections  
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 3  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
387
the effect of socioeconomic categories in terms of electoral participation at 
European level, in EMU Member States. 
When estimating (last) national elections participation, additional 
covariates refer to life, democracy and government satisfaction as well as trust 
in national parliament, politicians and parties. Now, the formal estimated 
regressions are given by: 
National Elections:   
Vin=D’inα+P’inβ+O’inγ+S’ieθ+T’ieμ+C’inλ+ε in 
where       (3) 
The probability of vote of citizen i in National Parliament elections50, Vin: 
          Vin=1 if participates to vote                                      
          Vin=0 if does not participates to vote, where: 
P’in is a vector which encloses now dummy variables regarding political 
orientation (i.e. extreme left-extreme right) and political interest. Additional 
controls are denoted by S’in which is a vector enclosing  satisfaction indicators 
(i.e. dummies for life satisfaction, government satisfaction, democracy 
satisfaction) and T’in is a vector of variables which refers to trust (i.e. dummies 
for trust in parties, politicians and Parliament). εin is the error term which is 
assumed to have a standard logistic distribution.     
As a counterpart for individual level estimations, we use aggregate 
panel data in order to identify whether and how the turnout gap is reflected in 
terms of party vote shares.  We analyze how the differences in vote shares 
obtained by the same party across elections can be explained as well as if 
“second order” theory features hold. Despite lower turnout of the European 
elections, smaller parties should obtain a higher vote share, while government 
parties should lose votes, since voters will vote strategically against government 
parties in order to express discontent regarding office performance (Reif, 
Schmidt, 1980). The formal regression is given by: 
Eurogap:   
 Vpj=P’pjα+ C’pjβ+M’pjρ+E’pjξ+εpj                                           
(4) 
where p=party, pϵ {1,2...z}; j=country, jϵ 
{1,2...24} 
Vpj is a continuous dependent variable, given by party vote share differential 
across European and National elections. Ppj is a vector of variables referring to 
party characteristics in terms of political ideology (i.e. dummies for extreme left 
to extreme right), a dummy for being in government at the time of the European 
elections, distance from the center and size (i.e. number of parliamentarians), 
                                                 
50 
 EU 17, non-historical order. 
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which are continuous variables. C’pj is a vector of politician's characteristics 
(attendance rate, loyalty to country majority and loyalty to political group) 
which are continuous variables. M’pj is a vector of variables enclosing 
information on GDP per Capita (continuous variable), and dummies referring to 
EMU membership and being a net-payer or a net-contributor at the European 
Union budget. E’pj is a vector  enclosing dummy variables indicating whether or not 
differences in electoral systems exists and the election year. εpj  is the error term. 
Since estimating equation (4) with OLS is somewhat problematic 
because our data is not independent, having an hierarchical structure as the data 
refers to different groups of parties, nested within countries. Therefore, we 
account for that by using OLS with clustered robust standard errors analysis in a 
first stage, and by using a multilevel51 model in a later stage. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
Empirical analysis is performed using data samples restricted to 
common Member States and variables. Table 552 compares turnout determinants 
across elections.  
Table 5 
National vs. European Vote Probability Determinants, (EU17) 
Vote Probability                              European Parliament Elections, 2009 
Last National 
Election, 2008 
Variables Coef. Std.Err.  Coef. Std.Err.  
Age 0.02 0.02   0.09* 0.03   
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 
  0.00 0.00   
Female -0.12 0.08 
  0.03 0.15   
Left 0.52** 0.13   -0.05 0.24   
Centre 0.16 0.11   -0.25 0.22 
  
                                                 
51
  Not reported. 
52
  Marginal effects are given in Table 5.1. Appendix. Within group correlated error term 
may have induced inflated statistics and biased standard errors. Testing for intra-class 
correlation, the coefficient found was very small, of 0.01 and was accounted for  by 
clustering by occupation. Since the standard errors decreased, this suggest that within 
clusters variation being very small, the model is better off without clustering. Therefore, 
only un-clustered robust standard errors are reported. 
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Right 0.40* 0.14   0.35 0.29 
  
Extreme Right 0.76** 0.18   -0.28 0.39 
  
Married 0.12 0.42   1.09** 0.32 
  
Single 0.04 0.43   1.15* 0.38   
Divorced 0.02 0.43   0.46 0.37   
Finished education 
between 16-19 
0.22 0.13   -0.11 0.17   
Finished education 
over 20 
0.59** 0.15   0.21 0.31   
Professional 0.67** 0.18   -0.06 0.50   
Manager 0.59* 0.25   -0.06 0.53   
High Skilled W.C. 0.39* 0.14   0.71 0.59   
Low Skilled W.C. -0.08 0.13   -0.32 0.63   
Blue Collar -0.16 0.13   -0.75 0.50   
Belgium 1.57** 0.21   0.28 0.46   
Denmark 0.37 0.19   0.72 0.45   
Deutschland 0.48* 0.17   -0.08 0.40   
Greece 1.42** 0.20   0.51 0.51   
Spain 0.28 0.18   0.55 0.51   
France 0.39* 0.18   -0.74 0.42   
Netherlands 0.28 0.20   0.20 0.45   
United Kingdom -0.85** 0.18   -0.98* 0.40   
Finland 0.16 0.19   -0.30 0.40   
Sweden 0.40* 0.18   0.35 0.42   
Czech Republic 0.03 0.18   -1.17* 0.43   
Hungary -0.06 0.19   0.30 0.52   
Latvia 0.17 0.17   -0.84 0.49   
Poland -0.45 0.18   -0.44 0.47   
Slovenia 0.57* 0.18   -0.93* 0.43   
Romania 0.83** 0.19   -0.67 0.45   
Constant -1.10 0.62   -1.02 1.03   
Observation number, 
Pseudo R2           6369 9%   6114 11.24%  
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
 
We observe two main discrepancies between determinants of vote 
probability. Firstly, occupational categories have a significant effect on vote 
probability only for European election and not for National elections: 
individuals placed on a higher scale (e.g. Professional, Manager, High-skilled 
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White Collars) have a positive effect on participation probability at European 
level. On the one hand, this confirms that for the European elections only the 
more advantaged layers of occupational categories are more likely to go to vote. 
Therefore socioeconomic class matter when deciding to vote for the EP 
elections. We find on average, for European elections, that socioeconomic 
discrepancies exist, consistent with Lijphart’s findings. Marginal effects53 
suggest that in European elections, under ceteris paribus, being a Professional 
increases the probability of voting by 15%, being a Manager by 13% and a High 
Skilled White Collar, by 9%, these results being statistically significant. 
Political orientation matters as well in the European elections, left, right 
and extreme right political ideology having a positively and statistically 
significant effect on voting probability. At national level, neither occupational 
categories nor political orientation have significant explanatory power. 
Country54 effects are relevant in explaining electoral participation. We 
observe at national level that statistically significant country effects are 
negative: UK, Czech Republic and Slovenia, have a negative statistically 
significant effect on voting probability. At European level, statistically 
significant country effects are twofold: being an United Kingdom citizen has a 
negative impact on European elections vote probability, while  being a citizens 
of either Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Sweden, Slovenia and 
Romania, has a positive effect on voting probability in European Parliament 
elections. But country effects may be driven by external events that happen 
before the elections, such as for example short-term political scandals, 
especially for individuals with a low vote intention. Still, voters that have a high 
vote intention are less likely to be influenced by external factors and even 
political campaigns55. 
Across elections, French and Slovenian citizens have a switching 
attitude, positive in European elections but negative in National ones. This 
could be interpreted as a potential disagreement with the national government 
manifested trough electoral participation rate: citizens vote less in national 
elections but more in European elections. Different incentives may be driving 
European citizenry to vote across elections. 
In what follows, we re-estimate the initial model, using the enhanced 
data set. Results are presented in Table 656, applying the Logit57 model. 
                                                 
53 
 Table 5.1, presents marginal effects, given in Appendix. 
54  Estimations have been run as well, excluding Belgium and Luxembourg in order to 
account for compulsory voting, not reported. Estimates are consistent with the 
unrestrained model.   
55
  Sunshine Hillygus, “Campaign Effects and the Dynamics of Turnout Intention in Election 
2000”, Journal of Politics, vol. 67, issue 1, 2005, pp. 50-68. 
56  Appendix, Table 6.1 presents complete estimation results and marginal effects. 
57  Ordered models support the empirical results when applying Logit. Not reported. 
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Professionals and higher educated individuals are more likely to participate to 
European Parliament elections, being positively and statistically significant. EP 
trust as well as knowledge about MEPs election have a positive effect on 
electoral participation. Different voting criteria concerning candidates' 
characteristics have a positive and statistically significant effect. When making 
decisions on voting, citizens take into consideration the candidate personality, 
notoriety, experience and position in both National and European political 
scene, as well as the candidate and its party position on EU politics. Therefore, 
even accounting for additional factors, politicians characteristics remain 
essential for explaining political participation decision. Discussing politics has a 
positive and statistical significant impact on the voting probability.  
 
Table 6 
EP Vote Probability Extended Model (EU 27, robust Std. Err.) 
Vote Probability                                                                                 Extended Model              
Marginal Effects            
Variables Coef. Std. Err.                        Coef.                       Std. Err. 
Stopped education between 16-19 years old 0.06 0.07   0.01 0.01 
Stopped education over 20 years old 0.21* 0.09   0.05* 0.02 
Education: still studying  0.68* 0.27   0.14* 0.05 
Professional 0.60* 0.31   0.12 0.05 
Owner 0.13 0.32   0.03 0.07 
Manager -0.17 0.28   -0.04 0.07 
High skilled White Collar 0.21 0.27   -0.04 0.07 
Low skilled White Collar -0.23 0.26   0.05 0.06 
Blue Collar 0.06 0.26   -0.05 0.06 
Supervisor -0.23 0.50   0.01 0.06 
Retired 0.15 0.25   -0.05 0.12 
Unemployed 0.01 0.27   0.03 0.06 
Housewife 0.12 0.29   0.03 0.06 
MEPs Election Knowledge: Yes 0.46** 0.06   0.08** 0.01 
MEPs Election Knowledge: Do not know 0.12 0.08   0.03 0.03 
MEPs Affiliation: Nationality -0.09 0.07   0.11** 0.02 
MEPs Affiliation: Political affinities 0.07 0.07   0.03 0.02 
European Elections vote: Candidate 
Personality 
1.48** 0.10 
  
-0.02 0.02 
European Elections vote: Candidate National 
Politics Position 
1.52** 0.10 
  
0.02 0.02 
European Elections vote: Candidate 
European Politics Position 
1.65** 0.11 
  
0.26** 0.01 
European Elections vote: Candidate Party EU 
Politics Position 
1.77** 0.11 
  
0.27** 0.01 
European Elections vote: Candidate 1.06** 0.12   0.28** 0.01 
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Notoriety 
European Elections vote: Candidate 
Experience in EU Politics  
1.61** 0.10 
  
0.30** 0.01 
European Elections vote: Candidate 
Experience in National Politics  
1.59** 0.10 
  
0.20** 0.02 
European Elections vote: Other Motivation 1.73** 0.40   0.28** 0.01 
Discuss politics (European): frequently 0.65** 0.10   0.27** 0.01 
Discuss politics (European): occasionally 0.30** 0.06   0.26** 0.03 
Discuss politics (European): do not know 0.75* 0.30   0.13** 0.02 
Trust European Parliament 0.61** 0.05   0.07** 0.01 
Professional (EMU) -0.17 0.32   0.13* 0.05 
Owner (EMU) -0.13 0.29   0.14** 0.01 
Manager (EMU) 0.40 0.23   -0.04 0.07 
High skilled White Collar (EMU) 0.17 0.23   -0.03 0.07 
Low skilled White Collar (EMU) 0.38 0.22   0.04 0.05 
Blue Collar (EMU) -0.18 0.21   0.08* 0.04 
Supervisor (EMU) 0.16 0.57   -0.04 0.05 
Retired (EMU) 0.02 0.18   0.03 0.12 
Unemployed (EMU) -0.06 0.24   0.01 0.04 
Housewife (EMU) 0.12 0.29   -0.01 0.06 
Newspaper  0.15 0.12   0.04 0.05 
Magazine -0.31 0.19   0.01 0.06 
TV -0.10 0.10   0.03 0.03 
Radio 0.14 0.13   -0.07 0.05 
Internet 0.19 0.12   -0.02 0.02 
Other Media -0.21 0.48   0.03 0.03 
EMU Member Country -0.03 0.20   0.04 0.03 
Observations number,  Pseudo R2  22886 19,28% 22886 19,28% 
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
Furthermore, different information sources do not have a significant impact 
on turnout rate. Being a member of European Monetary Union, has a negative 
effect on electoral participation in EP elections, not significant. In terms of marginal 
effects, trusting the European Parliament increase the probability of participating to 
European elections by 14%. Political information covariates effects slightly 
decrease now, confirming the endogeneity of political information in determining 
turnout. Not controlling for this factor, leads to upward biased results. 
Table 758 presents information concerning National elections. Using the 
enhanced dataset, occupational categories are still not statistical significant. It 
can be observed that being satisfied with life has a positive effect on political 
participation. Individuals may expect that their action of voting could be 
reflected in the government policies decision-making and policies pursued. 
                                                 
58
  Appendix, Table 7.1 presents full estimation results. 
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Table 7 
National Vote Probability Determinants (EU17, robust Std. Err.) 
 Vote Probability   Extended Model    Marginal Effects 
Variables Coef.              Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Primary education -1.04 0.87 -0.08 0.09 
Lower secondary education -0.60 0.85 -0.02 0.04 
Upper secondary education -0.47 0.85 0.02 0.02 
Post-secondary education -0.12 0.91 -0.02 0.03 
First tertiary education -0.14 0.86 -0.02 0.03 
Second tertiary education 1.48 1.20 -0.04 0.03 
Low Skilled White Collar -0.43 0.65 -0.02 0.04 
High Skilled White Collar 0.57 0.61 0.02 0.02 
Professional -0.44 0.52 -0.02 0.03 
Manager -0.38 0.54 -0.02 0.03 
Blue Collar -0.71 0.51 -0.04 0.03 
Trust National Parliament  0.32 0.21 0.01 0.01 
Trust Politicians 0.13 0.30 0.01 0.01 
Trust Party 0.04 0.31 0.00 0.02 
Political interest very 
interested 0.88* 0.33 0.03* 0.01 
Political interest quite 
interested 
0.80* 0.28 0.03* 0.02 
Political interest hardly 
interested 
0.43 0.28 0.02 0.01 
Life Satisfaction Not Very -0.28 0.40 -0.02 0.02 
Life Satisfaction Fairly 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.01 
Life Satisfaction Very 0.45 0.25 0.02* 0.01 
National Government 
Satisfaction Rather Bad 0.26 0.20 0.01 0.01 
National Government 
Satisfaction Rather Good 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.01 
National Government 
Satisfaction Very Good 
-0.28 0.54 
-0.02 0.03 
National Democracy 
Satisfaction Rather Bad 
0.04 0.23 0.00 0.01 
National Democracy 
Satisfaction Rather Good 
-0.04 0.27 0.00 0.01 
National Democracy 
Satisfaction Very Good 
0.05 0.38 0.00 0.02 
ROXANA NEDELESCU 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 3  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
394
Observation number,  
Pseudo R2 6146 14% 6146 14% 
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Indeed, voters preferences should be reflected in the different policies 
promoted by political parties. Trust in political parties, politicians and national 
parliament increase the probability of participating to National elections. 
However, it does not have any statistically significant impact on electoral 
participation decision. Regardless, trust determines in fact the legitimacy of 
parties to govern: trusting the political parties is a form of manifesting 
satisfaction with the policy outcomes that parties promote and implement.   
 
 
Party Vote Share Gap 
 
Table 8 presents turnout gap estimates in terms of party vote share.  
 
Table 8 
Party Vote Shares Gap across Elections 
 
 
Cluster OLS 
 
Turnout Gap   Coef  Std.Err   
European Monetary Union   -1.40* .77   
Net Payer   -2.54** .92   
Electoral System Differences   .24 .68   
Government   3.82 4.06   
Left   1.65 1.69   
Centre   .27 2.16   
Right   3.47 2.13   
Extreme Right   3.93 3.14   
Centre Distance   .10 .67   
Party Size   -.22* .10   
Party Size Squared   .00 .00   
Attendance Rate Plenary   .02 .13   
Loyalty to Country Majority   -.03** .01   
Loyalty to Political Group   -.07 .09   
Log GDP per Capita   .37 1.54   
Left Government   1.87 1.71   
Right Government   .97 2.40   
Centre Government   2.20 1.82   
Extreme Right Government   -5.95 3.68   
Year 2009   -.66 .52   
Constant   7.02 15.85   
Observation number, 237   
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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We find that being an EMU member deepens the gap across European 
and National vote shares.  EMU countries have had to face more economic 
constraints in order to meet the accession criteria, while their citizens had to 
face the immigration of foreign and cheaper labor force into the national labor 
market. Therefore, for EMU Members, citizens be less supportive for the EU 
overall and may vote more in the National elections than in the European ones. 
For parties within net payer countries the vote share decreases across 
elections. Being a net payer country could be a possible explanation of low 
electoral participation in the EP elections, as citizens of the concerned Member 
States may believe they contribute more to the EU than they actually get in 
return. However, EU should compensate budget contribution in terms of 
policies. Furthermore, we do not find significant evidence for European 
elections being used as a punishment against governing parties, nor that the 
difference in electoral systems across election confuse voters, determining them 
to vote less. Larger parties perform better in National elections and lose votes in 
EP elections in favor of smaller parties.  
In terms of MEP characteristics, voting according to country majority, 
therefore being more nationalists, has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on vote share gap. Therefore one feature of the second-order election is 
confirmed, namely, that large parties lose votes in the European elections. 
However, voters do not seem to punish government parties by voting against 
them in the European elections, but rather cast their vote sincerely. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The study conducted provides new perspectives on electoral 
participation incentives at European and national level. This research work 
aimed at highlighting on the one hand, the increased importance of the 
European Parliament decision-making role and on the other, the decreased 
voters' turnout.  In order to understand and correct this trend, our model allows 
firstly to compare turnout determinants between European and national 
elections using a restricted sample of Member States. Then, we performed 
individual estimations of electoral turnout determinants in order to take 
advantage of the richness of our samples concerning European and National 
elections and were able to confront individual electoral behavior with aggregate 
turnout data which refer to party vote share. 
 As main findings, differences in determinants of vote probability at 
national and European level exist.  Socioeconomic criteria are relevant only for 
European Parliament elections, individuals placed on a higher socioeconomic 
scale having a positive and statistically significant effect on voting probability. 
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This confirms that at the European level there could exist indeed a 
representation gap induced by unequal electoral participation. However, other 
factors are accounted for when deciding to participate to supranational elections 
such as the candidate personality, notoriety, experience and position on both 
National and European political scene, as well as the candidate and party 
position on EU politics. Since European Parliament's performance is less visible 
and more difficult to be directly assessed by the Europeans, information related 
to politicians’ quality might influence individuals when deciding to participate 
to elections or not. Therefore increasing political knowledge and politicians' 
quality might be a way for increasing turnout. However, mass media 
information sources do not seem to have a high role in explaining turnout. 
For the “first-order” elections, turnout is generally higher. Life 
satisfaction and interest in politics increases significantly the probability of 
electoral participation. Moreover, country specific characteristics rather than 
socioeconomic categories explain better voters’ participation at national polls.  
Looking at aggregate data, we find that European elections are not used 
as a protest against the governing parties, which is in line with Koepke and 
Ringe (2006) and Weber (2007). This highlights the fact that European elections 
are seen as an opportunity to cast one’s vote sincerely. We do however find 
evidence that large parties lose votes in European elections, the results 
corroborating with previous findings59. EMU membership as well as being a 
net-payer country proves to deepen the gap across elections in terms of electoral 
participation.  
Our results contribute to the previous literature in an innovative way by 
highlighting that there are different incentives which drive European citizenry to 
vote at National level with respect to European level. The results we have 
obtained support previous findings of Schmitt and van der Eijk (2001), as we do 
find socioeconomic categories to have a significant role in determining electoral 
participations. In addition to Besley, Pande and Rao (2005) which highlight the 
importance of politicians’ selection, we find that citizens take into account 
politicians’ characteristics when deciding to vote. It may be one of the main 
electoral participation incentives. All in all, we have proven that the most recent 
EP elections remain of “second-order” nature, despite the increased powers of 
the European Parliament after the Lisbon Treaty. However, more information 
on the European Union, European Parliament and making the supranational 
political scene more attractive, could increase electoral participation in order to 
reduce the risk of biased political representation, especially in the context of 
difficult macroeconomic conditions and decreased EU support of citizens from 
EMU and net-payer Member States. 
                                                 
59  Federico Ferrara, Timo Weishaupt, “Get Your Act Together Party Performance in European 
Parliament Elections”, European Union Politics, vol. 5, no. 3, 2004, pp. 283-306. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1.1 
 National and European Elections Turnout,  
Gap (%), by Country 
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Table 5. 1 
Marginal Effects National vs. European Vote Probability, (EU17) 
Vote Probability                               
European 
Parliament 
Elections, 2009 
Last National 
Election, 2008 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.00** 0.00 
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Left 0.12** 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Centre 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
Right 0.09* 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Extreme Right 0.16** 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
Married 0.03 0.10 0.07* 0.03 
Single 0.01 0.10 0.04** 0.01 
Divorced 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.01 
Finished education between 16-19 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
Finished education over 20 0.14** 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Professional 0.15** 0.04 0.00 0.03 
Manager 0.13* 0.03 0.00 0.03 
High Skilled W.C. 0.09* 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Low Skilled W.C. -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04 
Blue Collar -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.04 
Belgium 0.28** 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Denmark 0.08 0.04 0.03* 0.01 
Deutschland 0.11* 0.04 0.00 0.02 
Greece 0.26** 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Spain 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 
France 0.09* 0.04 -0.05 0.03 
Netherlands 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.02 
United Kingdom -0.21** 0.04 -0.07 0.04 
Finland 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.03 
Sweden 0.11* 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 
Hungary 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 
Latvia 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Poland -0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.04 
Slovenia 0.13** 0.04 0.13** 0.04 
Romania 0.17** 0.03 0.17** 0.03 
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Ref. Variables: Extreme Left, Other Civil Status, Stopped education before/at 
15 years old, Farmer and Fishermen, Portugal.  
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Table 6.1 
EP Vote Probability Extended Model (EU 27, robust Std.Err.) 
Vote Probability                                                                                 Extended Model                  Marginal Effects           
Variables Coef. Std. Err.                 Coef.     Std. Err. 
Age 0.03* 0.01   0.01* 0.00 
Age squared 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Female 0.09 0.05   0.02 0.01 
Political party: Left -0.16 0.10   -0.04 0.02 
Political party: Centre -0.22* 0.09   -0.05* 0.02 
Political party: Right 0.03 0.10   0.01 0.02 
Political party: Extreme Right 0.17 0.12   0.04 0.03 
Political party:  Do not know -0.46** 0.11   -0.11** 0.03 
Married/ Living with partner 0.17* 0.07   0.04* 0.02 
Single 0.17 0.10   0.04 0.02 
Other civil status -0.13 0.32   -0.03 0.07 
Stopped education between 16-19 years old 0.06 0.07   0.01 0.02 
Stopped education over 20 years old 0.21* 0.09   0.05* 0.02 
Education: still studying  0.68* 0.27   0.14* 0.05 
Professional 0.60* 0.31   0.12 0.05 
Owner 0.13 0.32   0.03 0.07 
Manager -0.17 0.28   -0.04 0.07 
High skilled White Collar 0.21 0.27   -0.04 0.07 
Low skilled White Collar -0.23 0.26   0.05 0.06 
Blue Collar 0.06 0.26   -0.05 0.06 
Supervisor -0.23 0.50   0.01 0.06 
Retired 0.15 0.25   -0.05 0.12 
Unemployed 0.01 0.27   0.03 0.05 
Housewife 0.12 0.29   0.03 0.06 
European Parliament heard of: Yes 0.35** 0.06   0.08** 0.01 
European Parliament heard of: Do not know 0.12 0.15   0.03 0.03 
MEPs Election Knowledge: Yes 0.46** 0.06   0.11** 0.02 
MEPs Election Knowledge: Do not know 0.12 0.08   0.03 0.02 
MEPs Affiliation: Nationality -0.09 0.07   -0.02 0.02 
MEPs Affiliation: Political affinities 0.07 0.07   0.02 0.02 
European Elections vote: Candidate 
Personality 
1.48** 0.10 
  0.26** 0.01 
European Elections vote: Candidate National 
Politics Position 
1.52** 0.10 
  0.27** 0.01 
European Elections vote: Candidate European 
Politics Position 
1.65** 0.11 
  0.28** 0.01 
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European Elections vote: Candidate Party EU 
Politics Position 
1.77** 0.11 
  0.30** 0.01 
European Elections vote: Candidate Notoriety 1.06** 0.12   0.20** 0.02 
European Elections vote: Candidate 
Experience in EU Politics  
1.61** 0.10 
  0.28** 0.01 
European Elections vote: Candidate 
Experience in National Politics  
1.59** 0.10 
  0.27** 0.01 
European Elections vote: Other Motivation 1.73** 0.40   0.26** 0.03 
Discuss politics (European): frequently 0.65** 0.10   0.13** 0.02 
Discuss politics (European): occasionally 0.30** 0.06   0.07** 0.01 
Discuss politics (European): do not know 0.75* 0.30   0.13* 0.05 
Trust European Parliament 0.61** 0.05   0.14** 0.01 
Professional (EMU) -0.17 0.32   -0.04 0.08 
Owner (EMU) -0.13 0.29   -0.03 0.07 
Manager (EMU) 0.40 0.23   0.04 0.05 
High skilled White Collar (EMU) 0.17 0.23   0.08 0.04 
Low skilled White Collar (EMU) 0.38 0.22   -0.04 0.05 
Blue Collar (EMU) -0.18 0.21   0.03 0.12 
Supervisor (EMU) 0.16 0.57   0.01 0.04 
Retired (EMU) 0.02 0.18   -0.01 0.06 
Unemployed (EMU) -0.06 0.24   0.04 0.05 
Housewife (EMU) 0.12 0.29   0.01 0.06 
Newspaper  0.15 0.12   0.03 0.03 
Magazine -0.31 0.19   -0.07 0.05 
TV -0.10 0.10   -0.02 0.02 
Radio 0.14 0.13   0.03 0.03 
Internet 0.19 0.12   0.04 0.03 
Other Media -0.21 0.48   -0.05 0.12 
EMU Member Country -0.03 0.20   -0.01 0.05 
Denmark 1.21** 0.15   0.03 0.03 
Belgium 0.13 0.13   0.21** 0.02 
Deutschland 0.26* 0.12   0.06* 0.03 
Greece 0.94** 0.14   0.18** 0.02 
Spain -0.07 0.13   -0.02 0.03 
France 0.35* 0.13   0.08* 0.03 
Ireland 0.90** 0.14   0.17** 0.02 
Italy 0.58** 0.14   0.12** 0.03 
Luxembourg 0.37* 0.17   0.08* 0.03 
Netherlands 0.06 0.14   0.01 0.03 
United Kingdom -0.60* 0.12   -0.14** 0.03 
Finland -0.25 0.13   -0.06 0.03 
Austria -0.43** 0.12   -0.10* 0.03 
Sweden 0.04 0.13   0.01 0.03 
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Republic of Cyprus 0.50* 0.17   0.10* 0.03 
Czech Republic -0.32* 0.13   -0.07* 0.03 
Estonia -0.37* 0.13   -0.09* 0.03 
Hungary -0.35* 0.13   -0.08* 0.03 
Latvia -0.04 0.12   -0.01 0.03 
Lithuania 0.00 0.07   0.16** 0.03 
Malta 0.84** 0.21   -0.18** 0.03 
Poland -0.74** 0.12   -0.13** 0.03 
Slovakia -0.53** 0.13   0.00 0.03 
Slovenia 0.00 0.13   0.01 0.03 
Bulgaria 0.04 0.12   0.11** 0.02 
Romania 0.51** 0.13   0.16** 0.03 
Observations number,  Pseudo R2  22886 19,28% 22886 19,28% 
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Ref. Variables:  Extreme Left, Divorced, Stopped education before/at 15 years 
old, Farmer and Fishermen, Farmer and Fishermen (EMU), European 
Parliament heard of: No, MEPs Election Knowledge: No, MEPs Affiliation: Do 
not know, European Election Vote Criteria: Do not know, Media source-none/ 
do not know, Never discuss (European) politics, Portugal. 
 
 
Table 7. 1 
National Vote Probability Extended Model (EU17, robust Std. Err.) 
 Vote Probability  Logit Marginal Effects 
Variables Coef. Std. Err.                                    Coef. Std. Err
Age 0.09* 0.03 0.00* 0.00 
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.01 
Left -0.06 0.25 0.00 0.01 
Centre -0.26 0.23 -0.01 0.01 
Right 0.28 0.29 0.01 0.01 
Extreme Right -0.20 0.39 -0.01 0.02 
Married 1.06** 0.33 0.06* 0.02 
Single 1.17** 0.38 0.04** 0.01 
Divorced 0.50 0.38 0.02 0.01 
Primary education -1.04 0.87 -0.08 0.09 
Lower secondary education -0.60 0.85 -0.02 0.04 
Upper secondary education -0.47 0.85 0.02 0.02 
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Post secondary education -0.12 0.91 -0.02 0.03 
First tertiary education -0.14 0.86 -0.02 0.03 
Second tertiary education 1.48 1.20 -0.04 0.03 
Low Skilled White Collar -0.43 0.65 -0.02 0.04 
High Skilled White Collar 0.57 0.61 0.02 0.02 
Professional -0.44 0.52 -0.02 0.03 
Manager -0.38 0.54 -0.02 0.03 
Blue Collar -0.71 0.51 -0.04 0.03 
Trust National Parliament  0.32 0.21 0.01 0.01 
Trust Politicians 0.13 0.30 0.01 0.01 
Trust Party 0.04 0.31 0.00 0.02 
Political interest very interested 0.88* 0.33 0.03* 0.01 
Political interest quite 
interested 
0.80* 0.28 0.03* 0.02 
Political interest hardly 
interested 
0.43 0.28 0.02 0.01 
Life Satisfaction Not Very -0.28 0.40 -0.02 0.02 
Life Satisfaction Fairly 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.01 
Life Satisfaction Very 0.45 0.25 0.02* 0.01 
National Government 
Satisfaction Rather Bad 0.26 0.20 0.01 0.01 
National Government 
Satisfaction Rather Good 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.01 
National Government 
Satisfaction Very Good 
-0.28 0.54 
-0.02 0.03 
National Democracy 
Satisfaction Rather Bad 
0.04 0.23 0.00 0.01 
National Democracy 
Satisfaction Rather Good 
-0.04 0.27 0.00 0.01 
National Democracy 
Satisfaction Very Good 
0.05 0.38 0.00 0.02 
Belgium -0.30 0.49 -0.02 0.03 
Denmark -0.28 0.50 -0.02 0.03 
Deutschland -0.78 0.45 -0.04 0.03 
Greece 0.28 0.54 0.01 0.02 
Spain 0.08 0.53 0.00 0.02 
France -1.24* 0.45 -0.09 0.05 
Netherlands -0.65 0.49 -0.04 0.04 
Voting in National and European Parliamentary Elections  
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 3  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
403
United Kingdom -1.57** 0.45 -0.13* 0.06 
Finland -1.14* 0.45 -0.09 0.05 
Sweden -0.44 0.46 -0.03 0.03 
Czech Republic -1.47* 0.47 -0.13 0.07 
Hungary 0.21 0.55 0.01 0.02 
Latvia -1.13* 0.55 -0.09 0.06 
Poland -0.93 0.50 -0.07 0.05 
Slovenia -1.43* 0.46 -0.13 0.07 
Romania -1.15* 0.49 -0.09 0.06 
Constant -1.19 1.30 - - 
Observation number, Pseudo 
R2 6146 14% 6146 14% 
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Ref. Variables: Extreme Left, Other Civil Status, Stopped education before/at 
15 years old, Farmer and Fishermen, Political interest: not interested, Life 
satisfaction: not satisfied, National Government Satisfaction: bad, National 
Democracy Satisfaction: bad, Portugal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
